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AQUINAS, HELL, AND THE 
RESURRECTION OF THE DAMNED 
Michael Potts 
Based on themes in Aquinas, this paper adds to the defense of the doctrine 
of an eternal hell, focusing on the state of those in hell after the resurrection. 
I first summarize the Thomistic doctrine of the human person as a body-
soul unity, showing why existence as a separated soul is truncated and 
unnatural. Next, I discuss the soul-body reunion at the resurrection, which 
restores an essential aspect of human nature, even for the damned. This 
reveals the love of God since He gives the damned the best human existence 
they can possibly have given their disordered wills. Finally, I defend this 
position against three important objections. 
One of the more interesting developments in contemporary philosophy 
of religion is the revival of interest in the doctrine of hell. It is well 
known that the notion of the wicked eternally suffering after death is a 
significant problem for theodicy. If any belief seems incompatible with 
the existence of an omnibenevolent God, it is this doctrine. Indeed, 
some Christian philosophers, such as John Hick, argue that hell is tem-
porary; all people will eventually respond to the love and mercy of 
God. ' Others, such as Richard Swinburne, have defended the notion 
that the wicked will be annihilated after death. 2 These options seem 
much easier for the Christian to defend than the traditional doctrine. 
Given this difficulty, it is remarkable that there are a number of contem-
porary Christian philosophers who defend the traditional doctrine of an 
eternal hell for the wicked.' These include Peter Geach, Jerry L. Walls, 
and Eleonore Stump: I believe that the approach of Stump, based on 
Thomistic metaphysics, is one of the more promising approaches to 
defending the traditional doctrine of hell. To oversimplify, Stump 
assumes with Aquinas that goodness and being are identical. Since this 
is the case, God's keeping the damned in existence is metaphysically bet-
ter than annihilating them. It also shows love for the damned, for it not 
only keeps "the damned from doing further evil," but it also 
prevents their further disintegration, their further loss of goodness 
and being. He [God] cannot increase or fulfill the being of the 
damned; but by putting restraints on the evil they can do, he can 
maximize their being by keeping them from additional decay.5 
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God is allowing the damned as much goodness and being as their self-
chosen nature allows them to have. In this way, hell shows the love of 
God, in that God unites Himself with the damned as much as their evil 
nature permits." Therefore, the existence of hell is compatible with the 
love and goodness of God. 
Like Stump, I believe the traditional doctrine of an eternal hell for the 
wicked is defensible. In this paper, working from the metaphysics and 
theology of Thomas Aquinas, I will focus on the state of those in hell after 
the resurrection. I will argue that the resurrection, even of the damned, 
reverses the "metaphysical horror"7 of death: the unnatural separation of 
soul from body. Although the damned, by turning away from the high-
est good, God, are in one sense totally removed from the actuality or full-
ness of human nature, in another sense they have as much human being 
as is possible for them in their evil state. That is, after the resurrection, 
the damned will have their soul-body unity restored, and since the soul-
body unity is essential to human nature, this is a metaphysical good for 
the damned. Deliverance from death, even for the damned, is a gift of 
grace due to the sacrifice of Christ. It is obvious that Aquinas' thought on 
these matters contains a mixture of philosophical and specifically 
Christian theological elements, and this mixture will be reflected in my 
discussion. The first section of the paper will summarize the well-known 
Thomistic doctrine of the human person as a body-soul unity, and why 
existence as a separated soul (as far as nature is concerned) is a truncated, 
unnatural state. In the second section I will discuss the soul-body 
reunion at the resurrection, which restores an important aspect of human 
nature, even for the damned. Hell reveals the love and mercy of God 
towards the damned since God gives them as much being and goodness 
as He possibly can given their disordered wills. The final section will 
defend this position against three important objections. 
1. 
It is well known that Aquinas follows Aristotle in holding that the 
human person is not the body alone (as the Atomists and contemporary 
physicalists believe) or the soul alone (as Plato and Descartes believe) 
but the soul-body composite. As Brian Davies points out, Aquinas 
"adopts a position midway between the extremes of Dualism and 
Physicalism."~ The soul, for Aquinas as well as for Aristotle, is "the 
form of the body."g The words "form" and "of the body" are both 
important. Form is the principle of being; it is the principle of actuality, 
as opposed to matter, the principle of potentiality. In living things, the 
soul is the form which gives them life. In the case of the human being, 
"the soul is that which gives the human body its act of existing."l0 
Aquinas believes that without the soul, a dead body which was once 
human can no longer properly be called "human," except in an equivo-
cal sense.ll The soul is therefore what gives otherwise dead matter its 
life and specific actuality as a particular kind of living thing. 
But the soul is not the whole human person; the soul is the form of the 
body. The soul and body require each other for their mutual completion. 
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The main reason for this is found in Aquinas' theory of human knowl-
edge. Following Aristotle, Aquinas believes that all knowledge begins 
with sense experience. The intellect knows by abstracting the intelligible 
content from material objects, and in order to do this the intellect 
requires a "phantasm" or sense image. '2 Even memory, needed for recall 
of previous knowledge, depends on phantasms. u And, as Aquinas says, 
since the operation of a sense is performed through a bodily organ, 
it is proper to the soul, according to the very condition of its 
nature, to be united to a body, and to be part of the human species, 
not having a complete species in itself. 14 
It is therefore natural for the soul to be united to a body, so much so that 
Aquinas quotes with agreement Aristotle's statement "that it is unneces-
sary to ask whether the soul and the body are one, just as it is unneces-
sary to ask whether the wax and its impression are one."!; Aquinas is 
clearly not a dualist in the Platonic or Cartesian sense; he affirms that the 
human being is the body-soul composite, and that this is the natural 
state of the human species. Indeed, this is reflected in the definition of a 
human being as a "rational animal." Animality, which includes material 
bodily existence, is just as necessary for the fullness of the human 
species as the soul.!6 
Given this strong affirmation of the unity of the human person, it 
might seem that Aquinas would believe that when a human being dies, 
he or she is "dead like Rover," dead all over, at least until the resurrec-
tion. But Aquinas does believe that the intellectual soul (i.e., the human 
soul, since the proper act of the human being is the act of the intellect) is 
incorruptible; thus, it survives death. Physical organs are oriented to 
particular things; the sense of sight, for example, sees individual objects. 
But the intellect understands the universal and therefore cannot be just 
the act of a physical organ, since understanding the universal transcends 
the power of physical bodies. Plus, the intellect naturally desires always 
to be, and a natural desire cannot be in vain. Therefore, the intellectual 
soul is incorruptible17 and survives the corruption of the physical body. 
However, given that the complete human being is not the soul, but 
the soul-body composite, at death the human person does not survive in 
his or her fullness. Davies again puts it well: 
if I die and only my soul survives, then I do not survive. For my 
soul is the soul of Brian Davies. And Brian Davies is a particular, 
perishable, bodily individual. Destroy my body, therefore, and 
Brian Davies ceases to exist. 18 
Again, this is partly related to the human mode of knowing, which is 
dependent upon sense images. In fact, this is the only way that humans 
can know individual things. Without the body, the soul can by nature 
only know individual things it knew while embodied on earth. It can 
also receive non-sensory infused species from separate substances (i.e., 
angels), but this knowledge is confused and indistinct. 19 This is the nat-
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ural state of the separated soul, (although God can directly infuse 
knowledge of individual things into the separated souls of the blessed).20 
Death, the separation of body and soul, diminishes the distinctly human 
activity of rationality, and thereby diminishes the humanity of those 
who die. 21 It also destroys the ability to feel passions such as "sensory 
love or hate, sadness or joy, anger, fear, or boldness,"22 since these con-
tain, according to Aquinas, a necessary bodily component." As such, the 
ability to control the passions by reason, a necessary component of the 
moral life, is missing in the separated souP' 
It is no surprise, then, that Aquinas considers the state of the separat-
ed soul as "unnatural." In fact, "the human soul...[has] an aptitude and 
a natural inclination to be united to the body."2s As such, 
to be separated from the body is not in accordance with its nature, 
and likewise to understand without turning to the phantasms is 
not natural to it, and hence it is united to the body in order that it 
may have an existence and an operation suitable to its nature. 26 
The separation of the soul from the body at death places the soul in an 
unnatural state; and inasmuch as it keeps rational creatures from return-
ing to God in the fullness of their natures (since they have diminished 
cognition), death is a "metaphysical horror," a disruption "in the very 
order of the universe."" The embodied human person is more con-
formed to God than the separated soul: 
Other things being equal, the state of the soul in the body is more 
perfect than outside the body, because it is part of the whole com-
posite; and every integral part is material in comparison to the 
whole: and though it were conformed to God in one respect, it is 
not simply. Because strictly speaking, a thing is more conformed 
to God when it has all that the condition of its nature requires since 
then most of all it imitates the Divine perfection.28 
Death marks a diminution in the amount of being in a human being; as I 
have noted, the separated soul cannot even properly be said to be a human 
person. Personal identity, properly speaking, is disrupted at death 
(although enough is preserved to help guarantee identity between death 
and resurrection). This is the case not only for the souls of the blessed, but 
also for the souls of the damned. God wills to give people as much being 
and goodness as possible. Even the damned, while existing as separated 
souls, lack some being and goodness which they might otherwise have. 
Their souls have some kind of truncated, albeit miserable, existence. But 
they lack the fullness of human nature, including the abilities to sense 
(which is the basis of intellectual knowledge) and to feel passions. The 
damned do not even properly have the dignity of receiving just punish-
ment for offenses which were committed in the body, since punishment for 
deeds done in the body must be meted out to the person, body and soul. 
This is true in spite of Aquinas' position that human beings, even as disem-
bodied souls, immediately go to heaven or hell after death (with the excep-
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tion of those souls who need cleansing in purgatory).2" Although the 
damned, as disembodied souls, are undergoing punishment for sins com-
mitted in their earthly existence, their ultimate punishment (and just 
deserts) awaits their bodily resurrection. As Aquinas puts it, "But in this 
life men, composed of soul and body, sin or act rightly. Therefore in both 
the soul and the body men deserve reward or punishment."3') His point is 
that since the soul is not the human being, but the soul-body composite, 
ultimately the body's resurrection is required to reward or punish the com-
plete human being, body and soul. The punishment of the damned prior 
to such resurrection is a temporary measure. Although their souls are suf-
fering the misery which necessarily results from their choice against God, 
full and adequate punishment awaits the resurrection. For all these rea-
sons, death is a metaphysical horror for all human beings, the saved as 
well as the damned, even though God by His grace mitigates this horror 
for the blessed by infusing intellectual species into their souls. 
II. 
This state of separation of soul and body, by the grace of God, will 
not last forever. Again, we must remember the fundamental Thomistic 
principle that grace fulfills nature. If death, due to sin, disrupts not only 
the order of human nature, but of the universe itself, then it is fitting that 
God would remedy this situation. As is the case with human death, 
Aquinas speaks of the resurrection as being in some sense natural, but in 
another sense, the gracious act of God. 
The resurrection is natural in the sense that it restores the proper 
structure of human nature: human beings are a composite of body and 
soul. As Aquinas puts it: 
the soul is naturally united to the body, for in essence it is the form 
of the body. It is, then, contrary to the nature of the soul to be 
without the body. But nothing which is contrary to nature can be 
perpetual. Perpetually, then, the soul will not be without the body. 
Since, then, it persists perpetually, it must once again be united to 
the body; and thus to rise again. Therefore, the immortality of the 
soul seems to demand a future resurrection of bodies." 
Humans also have a natural tendency to happiness, which cannot be ful-
filled unless they live with the fullness of their nature, as body-soul compos-
ites.32 Of course only the blessed who have chosen the highest end will attain 
this happiness, but it would not be possible without the resurrection of the 
body. Also, in order for the proper distribution of rewards and punishments 
to be made by God, it is necessary that the soul be reunited to the body, since 
it is the human being, body and soul, which acts rightly or wrongly." 
From these considerations it might seem that the resurrection of all 
human beings is wholly a natural event and not an act of grace. Montague 
Brown argues that since not all will be saved, the resurrection of all "is not 
wholly an act of grace." Indeed, we need "to distinguish ... two meanings of 
resurrection-the one of nature for all, and the one of grace for the elect.""" 
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The resurrection of all is an act of grace, Brown claims, in the sense that all 
beings are products of grace, in so far as they are creations of God that act 
according to their natures." As Aquinas puts it, 
Resurrection is natural if one considers its purpose, for it is natural 
that the soul be united to the body. But the principle of resurrec-
tion is not natural. It is caused by the divine power alone.'6 
However, in addition to the grace of divine power needed to raise a 
dead person to life, there remains a sense in which the resurrection of all 
human beings is an effect of the special supernatural grace shown by God 
through Jesus Christ. Christ came not just to free human beings from sin 
but also from death; freedom from physical death is a gift which all peo-
ple shall share, whether they be blessed or damned.'? Aquinas says: 
For the Son of God assumed human nature to restore it. Therefore, 
what is a defect of nature will be restored in all, and so all will 
return from death to life. . ... For the necessity of dying is a deficien-
cy brought upon human nature by sin. But Christ, by the merit of 
his passion, repaired the deficiencies of nature which sin had 
brought upon nature.3H 
One purpose of the resurrection is to restore human nature in its full-
ness, at least in the sense that the human body-soul composite will be 
restored. The resurrection restores the "final perfection of the human 
species" since the human species is incomplete as long as it consists of 
separated souls. "Therefore, it is necessary for alL.to rise again."39 
Christ indeed died for all, and His work applies even to the damned 
regarding what is needed for the fullness of the human species: 
All, both good and wicked, are conformed to Christ, while living in 
this life [i.e., the resurrection life], as regards things pertaining to 
the nature of the species, but not as regards matters pertaining to 
grace. Hence all will be conformed to Him in the restoration of 
natural life, but not in the likeness of glory, except the good alone.!I1 
Since it takes an act of grace to restore the proper nature of the human 
species, nature is fulfilled by the grace of God shown in Christ's incarna-
tion, death, and resurrection. As regards physical death and the bodily 
defects resulting from the Fall, this is true of the damned as well as the 
saved. Indeed, Aquinas believes that 
whatever defect or deformity was in the body through corruption, 
or weakness of nature or of natural principles (for instance fever, 
purblindness, and so forth), will be entirely done away at the res-
urrection:] 
Like the bodies of the saved, the bodies of the damned will be incorruptible, 
restored to the fullness of their body-soul unity. Even the bodies of the 
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damned will rise at the ideal age of around thirtyY The resurrection of the 
damned restores the good of the human species, and in this way God 
restores as much good to human nature as possible, even to the damned. 
The continuance in being of the resurrected damned, therefore, is a meta-
physical good, correcting the metaphysical horror of death and restoring 
the order of nature lost at the Fall. The damned have the fullness of their 
nature and are capable of knowing in the properly human way, by means 
of phantasms. They can also feel passions, an important aspect of a distinc-
tively human life. God is graciously giving them the most being that they 
can possibly have, given the disordered nature of their wills. They conform 
to Christ as much as they are capable, since they have the full, embodied 
nature of the human species. Hell, especially after the resurrection, is a gra-
cious gift, reflecting the love of God and His desire for creatures to join with 
Him as much as possible. It also treats the damned with dignity, for treat-
ing a person according to justice is to treat him or her as a free, responsible 
human being. Since this can only be done to a complete human being, body 
and soul, it is fitting that the damned be raised with their bodies. 
A critic may reply, U All this talk about metaphysical goodness and 
restoring the goodness of nature sounds good, but it ignores the basic 
issue: the eternal suffering of the damned. Surely this is still incompati-
ble with the existence of an omnibenevolent deity. We should remem-
ber that for Aquinas, the wicked not only suffer the pain of conscience 
forever, but also the physical pain of literal fire. Being raised with all the 
senses intact and an incorruptible body just seems to be a way that a 
sadistic God can more thoroughly torture the damned for eternity. 
Having their place in the divine order is no comfort for them." 
The first thing to be said in response is that for Aquinas and any tradition-
al thinker on hell, hell is a very bad place. It is a place reserved for those who 
irrevocably reject, by their own free will, their highest end, God. Much of the 
harm the damned suffer is due to their own evil wills. There is also a pain of 
sense. Aquinas believes this to be a literal fire, but Geach has convincingly 
argued that it can be reinterpreted as the inevitable pain resulting from evil 
people attempting to exploit and abuse a reconstituted natural world. The 
torment Geach describes might be physical (e.g., much of our suffering in 
this life results from our pollution of nature) or psychological, since nature 
will not yield to the wills of those who are evilY Since nature will obey God 
and not the damned, nature will torment them as they try to make use of it."4 
As for the eternity of hell, Stump argues that since the damned have made 
evil their "second" nature, it is reasonable to hold that they will never choose 
their ultimate end, God."" They can, however, live the best life they are capa-
ble of living in their twisted state, and this God mercifully allows them to do. 
As Stump points out, to annihilate the damned would be a waste, eradicat-
ing their being, and thus would not be open to a good God.'" 
Yet would the damned themselves see hell as merciful? Would not 
they themselves prefer annihilation to their miserable existence? I am 
not convinced that this would be the case. Surely there are many people 
in this life who are miserable due to their evil way of life, but they still 
desire to continue living. If we take away Aquinas' notion of hell as a 
literal fire and reinterpret it, as does C. S. Lewis, as the damned being 
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"left to themselves," it is not self-evident that the damned would prefer 
annihilation to hell. Since they are in hell, they have chosen the self 
against God (or have least tried to), and are therefore narcissistic any-
way. In that case, why would they want to choose annihilation of the 
only thing they have ever loved? And since they will still be rational 
animals, even in hell, the instinct to survive, which is a part of animal 
nature, will be intact. 
So hell indeed reflects God's goodness, wisdom and love. As the 
inscription over hell in Dante's Inferno reads: 
Justice moved my great Maker; God eternal 
wrought me; the power and the unsearchably 
high wisdom, and the primal love supernal.47 
III. 
In the concluding section, I will defend this position against three 
important objections. The first objection is presented by Jonathan 
Kvanvig, in opposition to Stump's position (and mine), that "being is the 
fundamental value." Kvanvig argues that this is not necessarily true; 
perhaps freedom is more fundamental.48 If freedom is more fundamen-
tal, then, if the wicked choose to be annihilated, this free decision should 
be respected by God. Because God is omnipresent, and "there is no place 
God is not,"49 to choose against being in the presence of God is to de facto 
choose annihilation. If freedom is an essential part of our rational nature 
(and it is the rationality of human nature which is so emphasized in 
Thomistic philosophy), then to violate freedom violates our rational 
nature. Thus, 
To aim at the well-being of humans, one must aim at the realiza-
tion of the potential of humanity for rationality. Because freedom 
is an essential component of rationality, one could not aim at the 
well-being of humans without honoring their freedom.50 
Therefore, preserving the well-being of those who choose to be separat-
ed from the presence of God is to allow their annihilation. 
One way to respond to Kvanvig's argument is this. The phrase, 
"choosing against being in the presence of God" is ambiguous. It could 
mean that the damned wish to continue to exist and act without the sus-
taining presence of God. In other words, they want to be separated from 
God in a metaphysical sense-to live totally apart from God's presence. 
But this desire is self-contradictory since, according to Christian theolo-
gy, it is impossible for a being to continue to exist without the sustaining 
presence of God. If God cannot cause contradictory states of affairs to 
come to be, He cannot grant the damned their wish to live totally apart 
from His presence. It goes beyond the evidence to say that what the 
damned have really chosen is to be annihilated. The damned may well 
recognize that God is omnipresent and that they cannot continue to exist 
without His keeping them in existence; but perhaps what they really 
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want is for God to leave them alone to fulfill their own selfish desires. 
Their desire may not be so much to be apart from God in a metaphysical 
sense as in a moral sense. By choosing the self and lesser goods above 
God, they may simply be choosing to be left alone in their evil. Both the 
damned and the saved are in the presence of God in a metaphysical 
sense, since God must causally sustain them in being. But the damned 
are separated from the presence of God in the sense that their free choice 
of the self instead of God does not allow them to experience the Beatific 
Vision, the vision of the essence of God. Even if the damned were 
offered the Beatific Vision, they would experience it as painful, while the 
saved experience it as joyful. Thus there are plausible interpretations of 
the choice of the damned which do not lead to Kvanvig's conclusion that 
they are de facto choosing annihilation. 
A second objection begins by reminding us that Aquinas says "noth-
ing which is contrary to nature can be perpetual."51 But all people have a 
natural desire for happiness. If this is so, how can God allow people to 
eternally exist in hell, where their "natural desire" for happiness will be 
eternally unfulfilled? Surely, this is a case in which something contrary 
to nature is perpetual. If God raises people from the dead to fulfill a nat-
ural desire out of respect for metaphysical order, why does He not guar-
antee that all be saved out of respect for the same metaphysical order? 
This is indeed a difficult problem. It is true that happiness can ulti-
mately be found only in the beatific vision of God. But the damned have 
separated themselves from the beatific vision, and their "natural desire" 
for happiness will remain unfulfilled. This state of affairs seems to be 
impossible on Thomistic grounds. There is a tension here between free-
dom and nature and between metaphysical order and the wrong choices 
of the damned, a tension which should not be minimized. Human free-
dom is what prevents God from fulfilling the natural desire of the 
damned for happiness. God can raise the dead and fulfill the natural 
desire to be, for the resurrection of all human beings is not contingent 
upon free choice. But people who freely choose to reject God cannot live 
in His presence, since this would violate their freedom. Nevertheless, 
the damned do attain "happiness" to the degree that they are capable. 
They return to God, as much as their free choices allow, by being 
restored to the fullness of their body-soul natures. Unlike Aquinas, I 
believe that they could freely choose God, and thus ultimate happiness, 
but, as a matter of fact, they do not. 
A final objection asks whether my argument implies that it is more 
important to God to restore the metaphysical order of the universe than 
to treat the damned with a just dignity and with love. The difficulty 
with this objection lies in its separation of love, justice, and metaphysics. 
But why should these be separated? The resurrection of the damned is a 
restoration of metaphysical order, and not annihilating them does mean 
that there is not a metaphysical "waste" of being. This understanding 
does not imply, however, that it is not in accord with justice to resurrect 
the damned and allow them to exist in hell. Neither does this imply that 
it is unloving to do so. That the resurrection is made possible by the 
work of Christ shows that, for Aquinas, the grace of God is needed to 
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fulfill nature and restore metaphysical order. It is both the case that the 
resurrection of all, including the damned, restores metaphysical order 
and that such resurrection is a loving gift of grace to the damned. To 
assert without further argumentation that this cannot be the case simply 
begs the question. 
This paper has defended the position that Eleonore Stump's point 
about hell being good, both metaphysically and for the damned them-
selves is a fortiori true after the resurrection. The fullness of human 
nature, as regards the species, is restored to all human beings, including 
the damned. They live as complete human beings, soul and body, not 
having to suffer the penalty of original sin, physical death. Human 
nature is restored, and a breach in the order of the universe is healed by 
the permanent reunion of human bodies and souls at the resurrection. 
Thus even the resurrection of the damned contributes to the order of the 
universe. The damned themselves are treated with all the respect, digni-
ty, and worth they can possibly be given in light of their choice against 
their ultimate end. This treatment reveals the love of God since He gives 
the damned the best human existence they can possibly have. Given 
their disordered wills, the misery they suffer in this eternity is their own 
making, for they do not recognize the grace and love shown to them. 
This is the ultimate tragedy in Aquinas' system. At the same time, we 
should recall that this tragedy reflects, not on the goodness of God, but 
on those who reject His grace. 
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